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http://www.jstor.orgACCURACY  IN THE ASSESSMENT  OF DAMAGES* 
LOUIS KAPLOW  and STEVEN  SHA  VELL 
Harvard  Law School and National Bureau  of Economic  Research 
ABSTRACT 
Assessment  of damages is a principal issue in litigation and, in light of this, we 
consider the social justification for, and the private benefits of, accurate measure- 
ment of harm. Greater accuracy induces injurers to exercise  levels  of precaution 
that better  reflect  the  magnitude of  the  harm they  are likely  to  generate,  and, 
relatedly,  it  stimulates  uninformed  injurers to  learn about  risks  before  acting. 
However,  accuracy  in assessment  of harm cannot  influence the behavior  of in- 
jurers-and  is therefore of no social  value-to  the degree that they lack knowl- 
edge of the harm they might cause when deciding on their precautions. Regardless 
of  the  social  value  of  accuracy,  litigants generally  gain by  devoting  resources 
toward proof of damages,  leading often  to  socially  excessive  private incentives 
to establish  damages. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
ASSESSMENT  of  damages  is  often  a principal  issue  in  litigation  because 
the  primary  objective  of  the  plaintiff  usually  is  to  collect  as  much  as 
possible  and  that  of  the  defendant  is  to  pay  as  little  as  possible.  Accord- 
ingly,  litigants  frequently  devote  substantial  time  and  effort  attempting 
to establish  the  level  of harm.  In light  of this,  the  question  naturally  arises 
concerning  the  underlying  social  purpose  of  accurate  determination  of 
harm.  Our object  here  is to address  this  question  and  to  compare  socially 
desirable  effort  to  ascertain  harm  with  what  parties  in  litigation  wish  to 
expend  on  the  task.  To  this  end,  we  consider  a version  of  the  now  stan- 
dard  model  of  liability  for  harm1  in  Section  II  of  the  article,  and  we 
develop  the  following  four  points.2 
* We are grateful  to Marcel  Kahan, the Journal's  editors, and participants  in seminars 
at Harvard  and New York University  Law Schools for helpful  comments,  and for research 
support  from  the John  M. Olin  Center  for Law, Economics,  and Business at Harvard  Law 
School. Shavell also acknowledges  aid from the National Science Foundation  (grant  no. 
SES-911-1947). 
l See, for example,  John  P. Brown,  Toward  an Economic  Theory  of Liability,  2 J. Legal 
Stud. 323 (1973);  William  M. Landes & Richard  A. Posner, The Economic Structure  of 
Tort Law (1987);  and Steven Shavell, Economic  Analysis of Accident  Law (1987). 
2 As will be seen, the emphasis  in this article  is on the points  that  assessment  of damages 
is not socially worthwhile  if parties  do not know the magnitude  of harm  when they act and 
that, despite this, parties may have strong incentives to spend to determine  damages in 
court. These points have not been developed  elsewhere  to our knowledge,  although  Louis 
[Journal  of Law and Economics,  vol. XXXIX (April 1996)] 
?  1996  by The University  of Chicago.  All rights  reserved.  0022-2186/96/3901-0006$01.50 
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First, accuracy in the assessment of harm leads potential injurers  to 
act in a way that reflects  the magnitude  of the harm  they might  cause-to 
take greater precautions the greater the harm they are likely to bring 
about. This fundamental  and familiar  point is the social justification  for 
accurate  assessment of damages  in the model.3 
Second, accuracy in the assessment of harm  cannot influence  the be- 
havior of injurers-and  is therefore of no social value-to  the degree 
that they lack knowledge of the level of harm they might cause when 
they make their decisions. Thus, if, when choosing his precautions, an 
injurer  knows only that the average level of harm  that would be caused 
in an accident  is $500,000,  there is no point  in the court's measuring  harm 
accurately. As long as the injurer's  expected liability is $500,000, his 
behavior  will be the same as if harm  were measured  precisely. 
Third, accuracy in assessing harm may spur injurers  to learn more 
before  they act about  the harm  they might  cause, for then they can benefit 
by altering  their level of precautions.  They will have no motive to learn 
about the level of harm  in advance if damages  will be based on average 
harm, for then the particular  level of harm will not affect their damage 
payments. That injurers  have an incentive to learn about harm before 
they act may of course be socially beneficial  because it is desirable  for 
the level of precautions  to reflect the magnitude  of the potential  harm. 
Fourth, litigants' incentives to  provide information  about harm to 
courts may be socially excessive. Defendants  will want to establish the 
true level of harm if it is less than estimated harm, and plaintiffs will 
want to demonstrate  the true harm  if it exceeds the estimated  level. But 
these incentives to establish  harm  exist independently  of the social value, 
Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal  Complexity  of Legal Rules, 11 J. L., Econ., & Org. 150 
(1995),  deals with closely related  issues in analyzing  which  variables  courts  optimally  ought 
to include  in legal rules. In addition,  for an informal  discussion  that expands  on the one in 
the present  paper, see Louis Kaplow, The Values of Accuracy  in Adjudication:  An Eco- 
nomic Analysis, 23 J. Legal Stud. 307 (1994).  There are, in addition,  a number  of articles 
on the subject  of accuracy  concerning  issues different  from  those addressed  in this article, 
including  Richard  Craswell & John Calfee, Deterrence  and Uncertain  Legal Standards, 
2 J. L., Econ., & Org. 279 (1986)  (on mistake  in assessing negligence);  Louis Kaplow & 
Steven Shavell, Accuracy  in the Determination  of Liability,  37 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1994); 
Ivan Png, Optimal  Subsidies  and Damages  in the Presence of Judicial  Error,  6 Int'l Rev. 
L. & Econ. 101 (1986);  A. Mitchell  Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Legal Error, Litigation, 
and the Incentive  to Obey the Law, 5 J. L., Econ., & Org.  99 (1989);  and Daniel  Rubinfeld 
& David Sappington,  Efficient  Awards and Standards  of Proof in Judicial  Proceedings, 
18 Rand J. Econ. 308 (1987)  (all on mistake  in determining  who committed  a punishable 
act);  and  Richard  Posner,  An Economic  Approach  to Legal  Procedure  and  Judicial  Adminis- 
tration,  2 J. Legal Stud. 399 (1973)  (a general  discussion  of accuracy). 
3 Another  possible  justification  for accuracy  is that it assures  victims  full compensation. 
We mention  this issue in Section III below but note that its importance  is not substantial, 
in part due to the presence of insurance  markets.  (The issue does not enter in our model 
because parties  are assumed  to be risk-neutral.) 193  ASSESSMENT  OF DAMAGES 
if any, of accurate  assessment of harm.  For example, the incentives exist 
when defendants, at the time that they act, do not know the level of 
harm, which is to say, when accuracy  in determining  harm  has no effect 
on behavior  and hence no social value. It is true as well that if defendants 
know or may learn  the level of harm  when they act, incentives to demon- 
strate harm  may be excessive. 
After analyzing these points, we consider briefly in Section III the 
generality  of our analysis and extensions to it concerning  settlement, risk 
aversion, the effect of injurers'  behavior  on the magnitude  of harm, and 
certain  aspects of information.  In Section IV, we discuss the implications 
of our analysis-including the possible utility of restricting  expenditures 
on ascertaining  damages, and also the use of tabular  damages-in  some 
typical settings of adjudication. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
Assume that risk-neutral  injurers  choose levels of precaution  x to re- 
duce the risk p(x) of accidents, where 0  <  p(x) <  1, p'(x)  <  0,  and 
p"(x)  >  0. A particular  injurer  will cause one particular  level of harm h 
if involved in an accident, but different  injurers  cause different  levels of 
harm. Let f(h) be the density of h on [0,oo),  where  f(h) > O.  Injurers  and 
courts are presumed to know the density f.  (This assumption can be 
reinterpreted  and relaxed, without  affecting  our results; see Sections IIIe 
and IIIf below.) 
If an accident occurs, the injurer  who caused it will be held strictly 
liable and will be required  to pay damages d in court (on the possibility 
of settlement, see, as noted, Section IIIb below). Assume also that there 
is a cost k to an injurer  of presenting  information  about harm  to courts.4 
In addition, in one version of the model, we will assume that there is a 
cost c to an injurer  of obtaining  information  about  harm  before he chooses 
his precautions. 
Social costs exclusive of the expense of obtaining  or presenting  infor- 
mation about h are 
f  [x(h) + p(x(h))  h]f(h) dh, 
*o 
where x(h) denotes the precautions  taken by injurers  who would cause 
losses of h. The social goal is to minimize  the sum of the foregoing  expres- 
sion and any relevant expenses of obtaining  and presenting  information 
about h. Let x*(h) denote the x that minimizes  x + p(x)h. 
4 The assumption  that k is borne by injurers rather than by courts  is, for the most part, 
inessential.  If k is borne by courts and damages are raised by k from the level we say below 
is optimal,  our conclusions  remain valid except,  as will be obvious,  in Section  IIC below. 194  THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
A.  Ex Ante Information  Is Exogenous 
We consider first the cases in which injurers  do and do not know h ex 
ante. We ask whether  it is desirable  for h to be observed  by courts, which 
would involve a cost k. Our conclusion (proved  in the appendix)  is: 
PROPOSITION  1.  (a) Suppose that injurers  do not know harm  h ex ante. 
Then it is optimal  for courts not to observe h and for damages  to equal 
h, expected harm. In this case, injurers  will behave socially optimally 
given their lack of information  about h. 
(b) Suppose that injurers  know harm ex ante. Then it is optimal for 
courts to observe h and for damages  to equal h (rather  than h) if and only 
if the cost k of observing  h is sufficiently  low. If damages  equal  h, injurers 
will behave socially optimally. 
The reason for l(a) is, of course, that if injurers  do not know h ex 
ante, their behavior cannot be affected by the fact that their damage 
payments will depend on h; because social resources must be expended 
for damage  payments  to depend on h, this cannot be desirable.5  Further- 
more, if d  =  h, injurers  will correctly take into account the expected 
harm  caused by their activity and thus be led to take proper  precautions. 
The explanation  for l(b) is that, when injurers  know h ex ante and 
their damage payments depend on h, they will, desirably, choose their 
level of precautions  in accord with h. Hence, if it is not too costly for h 
to be observed by courts, that will be socially worthwhile. 
B.  Endogenous  Acquisition  of Information  Ex Ante 
Suppose now that injurers  choose whether to acquire information  ex 
ante by making  an expenditure:  initially,  they do not know h, but if they 
spend c, they learn h ex ante. In this case, the result is: 
PROPOSITION  2.  Suppose that injurers  can learn harm h ex ante by 
making  an expenditure  c. 
(a) If it is not socially optimal for injurers  to learn h ex ante, it is 
optimal  for courts not to observe h and for damages to equal h. In this 
case, injurers  will not learn h and will behave optimally  given their lack 
of information  about h. 
(b) If it is socially optimal  for injurers  to learn h ex ante, it is optimal 
S More precisely,  taking as given an injurers' ex post litigation costs,  we see that behavior 
is unaffected by  whether or not damages depend on h. But when damages do not depend 
on h, injurers do not spend k in the event  of an accident.  Expected  liability costs  are thus 
lower,  and so will be injurers' precautions.  This change in behavior,  however,  is efficient: 
the  social  cost  of accidents  is lower because  resources  are no longer spent determining h 
each time there is an accident.  (This is apparent in the proof in the Appendix.) 195  ASSESSMENT  OF DAMAGES 
for courts to observe h and for damages  to equal h. In this case, injurers 
will learn h and will behave optimally.6 
The result in 2(a) follows from proposition l(a)  and the fact that in- 
jurers will clearly have no incentive to learn h ex ante when damages  are 
h. The result in 2(b) will follow from proposition  l(b) if, when damages 
are h and it is socially optimal for injurers  to learn h, they are in fact 
induced  to learn  h. We prove this in the Appendix.  Essentially, the result 
holds because the social benefit  of injurers  becoming  informed  is internal- 
ized by injurers  when damages  equal h. 
C.  Endogenous  Reporting  of Information  Ex Post 
Suppose here that, whether  or not injurers  know h ex ante, after acci- 
dents occur injurers  (defendants)  and victims (plaintiffs)  know h and ei- 
ther type of party  can elect to establish  h to courts at cost k. (We assumed 
above that courts, not parties, decide whether  or not k is spent to estab- 
lish h.) Let us first reconsider  the case in which injurers  do not know h 
ex ante. 
PROPOSITION  3.  Suppose that injurers  do not know harm  h ex ante and 
that, after an accident, parties  choose whether  or not to spend k to estab- 
lish h to courts. 
(a) It is optimal for damages to equal expected harm h regardless of 
whether  a party  establishes  h. In this case, no parties  will spend to estab- 
lish h. 
(b) If instead  damages  equal  h whenever  a party  establishes  h, plaintiffs 
and defendants  will sometimes  spend  k to establish  h, which is inefficient. 
With  regard  to 3(a), we know from  proposition  1  (a) that, when injurers 
do not know h ex ante, setting damages equal to h will induce them to 
take optimal precautions  given their lack of knowledge of h. And when 
damages equal h, parties will obviously have no incentive to spend to 
establish h, which could only add to social costs. Moreover,  with respect 
to 3(b), if damages equal h whenever a party establishes h, defendants 
will spend k to do this when h +  k < h, and plaintiffs  will spend k when 
h -  k >  h; thus k will be spent when Ih -  h\ >  k. 
The excessive private incentive to spend to establish h, described in 
6 This  result  about  the desirability  of accurate  assessment  of h by courts  may  be compared 
to another beneficial  effect of accuracy  under  assumptions  different  from ours. Suppose 
that, if courts  do not accurately  assess harm,  parties  will expend  effort  to predict  the errors 
courts would make (even though the parties  might know the true harm).  Then accurate 
measurement  of harm  by courts would be beneficial  because it would discourage  parties 
from investing  effort to predict  courts' errors.  On this general  issue, see Louis Kaplow & 
Steven Shavell, Private  versus Socially Optimal  Provision  of Ex Ante Legal Advice, 8 J. 
L., Econ., & Org. 306 (1992). 196  THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
3(b), exists because, after an accident occurs, a party may well have a 
positive motive to spend to establish h so as to alter damages in his 
favor. But this motive is unrelated  to the incentive benefit associated 
with establishing h-a  benefit that is nonexistent when injurers  do not 
know h ex ante. 
Now let us reconsider  the case in which injurers  know harm  ex ante. 
We have (see the Appendix  for the proof): 
PROPOSITION  4.  Suppose that injurers  know harm h ex ante and that, 
after an accident, parties choose whether or not to spend k to establish 
h to courts. 
(a)  The optimal  damages  rule is defined  as follows: 
(i)  if a party  establishes  h and h lies outside a specified  interval 
[hi, h2], damages  equal h; 
(ii)  if a party establishes h and h lies inside the interval, or if 
both parties are silent, damages equal hc, the conditional 
mean  of h in [h,, h2]; 
(iii)  defendants  reimburse  plaintiffs  for the cost k  of establishing 
h when plaintiffs  establish h and h lies outside the interval. 
(b)  Under  the optimal  damages  rule, defendants  will establish  h when 
h < h~, both parties will be silent when h lies in [hi, h2], and 
plaintiffs  will establish h when h > h2. 
(c)  If instead damages equal h whenever a party establishes h and 
plaintiffs  are reimbursed  for k whenever they establish  h,  then 
more  plaintiffs  and more defendants  will establish h than under 
the  optimal  damages  rule. 
The  central feature of the socially optimal  rule is that parties are dis- 
couraged  from demonstrating  h if h lies in a midrange-the  interval 
[hi, h2]-and  otherwise they are led to establish h. The reason for this 
feature  of the rule is in essence that the cost  k  of establishing  h to courts 
is socially worthwhile  to incur if and only if the resulting  improvement 
in  incentives is sufficiently  large, something  that will be true if and only 
if  h is relatively  high or low. 
The  argument  establishing  that the rule is optimal  may be sketched as 
follows  (the proof is in the Appendix).  Consider  a dictator  who not only 
can  set damages  but also can order  individuals  to report  h or to be silent. 
If  it can be demonstrated  that the rule of the proposition  leads to the 
same  outcome as the dictator can  achieve, then the rule  of the proposition 
must  be optimal. 
The  dictator  would set damages  equal to h when individuals  establish 
h  because injurers  will be induced  to take optimal  precautions  if they pay 197  ASSESSMENT  OF DAMAGES 
the full costs of accidents, h +  k. Note that this amount  is what injurers 
will in fact pay if damages  are h and they establish h and thus bear k, or 
if plaintiffs establish h and injurers  reimburse  them for k. The dictator 
would also want damages to equal h~ when parties are silent, for hc is 
the expected harm  due to accidents caused by those who will be silent. 
Finally, the dictator  must choose the interval  [h~, h2] for which parties 
must be silent. The optimal h~  is less than hc -  k. To explain, consider 
a defendant  who has caused harm  h equal to hc -  k. His precautions  will 
be x*(hc) if he will not report  h, and his precautions  will be the same if 
he will report h (for then his damages  will be hc -  k and he will spend 
k, so that his total expenses will be he). Because his precautions  will not 
be altered  if he reports  h, it must be best for the defendant  to be ordered 
to be silent, saving resources of k; hence, the optimal h~ is lower than 
hc -  k. Similar  reasoning  explains why the optimal  h2 exceeds hc 
Now it is evident that under  the damages  rule of the proposition,  with 
[h1, h2] being the interval  that the dictator  would choose, individuals  will 
behave as asserted in 4(b) and report h if and only if h lies outside the 
interval.  (Thus, the outcome under  the rule  will indeed  be that achievable 
by the dictator.) In particular,  a defendant  will want to reveal h when it 
is less than h, even though this costs him k because, as just discussed, 
hI <  h~ -  k. No party will want to spend k to reveal h if h is in [h,, h2], 
for then damages  will be he  regardless  of the particular  value of h in the 
interval. And a plaintiff  will always want to establish h if h >  h2, for the 
plaintiff  does not bear k. 
With  regard  to excessive incentives to prove h under  the usual rule, as 
described  in 4(c), observe that defendants  would sometimes inefficiently 
spend to demonstrate  h if doing so would always result in damages  of h: 
because h~ <  hc -  k, defendants  would pay k to prove h when h is in 
[hi,  ht  -  k). Also, plaintiffs obviously would sometimes inefficiently 
spend to establish h if this would always result  in their  receiving  damages 
of h and being reimbursed  for k, for then they would choose to establish 
h whenever h >  hc.  These problems  of excessive incentives to demon- 
strate h when doing so always affects damages are again caused by the 
fact that a party's motive to prove h is unrelated  to the associated incen- 
tive benefit. 
Last, let us consider the case in which injurers  choose whether  or not 
to spend c to learn about harm  ex ante. 
7 We remark that plaintiffs might not have an excessive  incentive  to establish  h if they 
have to bear k (which would not be optimal). The reason is that then defendants  would be 
underdeterred.  See  the preceding version  of this article: Louis  Kaplow & Steven  Shavell, 
Accuracy  in the  Assessment  of  Damages  (Working Paper No.  4287,  Nat'l  Bureau Econ. 
Res.  1993). 198  THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
PROPOSITION  5.  Suppose  that injurers decide  whether or not to learn 
harm h ex ante and that, after an accident,  parties choose  whether or not 
to establish  h to courts. 
(a) If it is not socially  optimal for injurers to learn h ex ante, then the 
optimal rule is that given in proposition 3, and injurers will not be induced 
to learn h. 
(b)  If  it  is  socially  optimal  for  injurers to  learn h ex  ante,  then  the 
optimal rule is that given  in proposition  4,  and injurers will be induced 
to learn h. 
Part 5(a) is obvious,  for when damages are unaffected by revealing h, 
injurers will have  no incentive  ex ante to obtain information about h or 
to spend ex post to establish it. Part 5(b) is clear, assuming that injurers 
are  led  to  spend  c  to  learn  h  when  that  is  socially  optimal,  for  then 
proposition 4 applies; the proof in the Appendix establishes  that injurers 
will in fact be induced to spend c when that is socially optimal, by reason- 
ing analogous to that given for proposition 2. 
III.  EXTENSIONS  OF  THE  ANALYSIS 
a)  Generality of Conclusions.  On reflection,  it can be  seen  that our 
main conclusions  apply more generally than to assessments  of harm in 
accidents.  Consider  the  conclusion  that it  is  not  socially  desirable  for 
resources  to be  spent informing courts of the magnitude of harm to the 
degree that harm was unknown to parties when they made their decisions. 
This  conclusion  is  true also  of  any elements  other than harm (such  as 
facts  about  causation)  unknown  to parties when  they  made their deci- 
sions,  under any  legal rule in any  area of  law  (for instance,  under the 
negligence  rule,  or under a  rule of  contract  damages).  The  reason,  of 
course,  is that making liability depend on elements  not known to parties 
when  they  choose  their actions  cannot  affect  their behavior.  Similarly, 
the other conclusions-about  the effect of considering a factor in assess- 
ing damages on parties' incentives  to learn about the factor ex ante,  and 
about parties' excessive  incentives  to present information to courts about 
such a factor ex post-also  hold more generally. 
b)  Settlement.  We assumed  in the model that all accidents  resulted 
in trials, but if we were to allow for settlement,  the qualitative nature of 
the conclusions  would not be substantially altered. The reasons  are two- 
fold.  First,  the  amounts  paid in settlement  tend  to  reflect the  amounts 
that would  be paid at trial, so that the incentive  effects  associated  with 
amounts  paid  in  settlement  would  resemble  those  associated  with 
amounts  paid at trial.  Second,  settlement,  like  trial, involves  expense. 
Settlement  is achieved  through bargaining, voluntary exchange  of infor- 199  ASSESSMENT  OF DAMAGES 
mation, and required  disclosure of information  (legal discovery). These 
are costly processes, and the more so when the information  of relevance 
to the parties includes the actual magnitude  of harm.8  Thus, the assump- 
tion in the model that parties incur a cost establishing  harm  to courts is 
mirrored  by the added costs parties  incur  in the settlement  process when 
courts base damages  on accurate  assessments of harm. 
c) Risk  Aversion  and Insurance.  Defendants'  risk aversion  is a factor 
disfavoring  accuracy in the determination  of harm, for a risk-averse  de- 
fendant  would prefer  damages  to be based on average  harm  than to bear 
the risk of actual  harm.9  Conversely,  plaintiffs'  risk aversion  favors accu- 
racy in determination  of harm  because this assures compensation  equal 
to losses.10  The availability  of liability  and  first-party  insurance,  however, 
qualifies  these points, for insurance  coverage  protects  parties  against  risk. 
It should also be noted that ownership  of liability  insurance  reinforces 
our point that accurate assessment of harm  may not much affect incen- 
tives. This is because the level of damages  that  are imposed  in the particu- 
lar instance will often matter little to a covered party, as his liability 
insurer  will pay most or all of a court award. 
d)  The Effect of Injurers' Precautions on the Magnitude of Harm. 
We assumed in the model that an injurer's  precautions  affected only the 
likelihood of harm, but they might  also influence  the magnitude  of harm 
by shifting  downward  the probability  distribution  of harm, as in Kathryn 
Spier's article.1l  If that is so, then determining  harm  accurately  has social 
value even when injurers  do not have foreknowledge  of a victim's type. 
Specifically, suppose that courts do not determine actual harm and 
8 See Lucian  Bebchuk,  Litigation  and Settlement  under  Imperfect  Information,  15 Rand 
J. Econ. 404 (1984), for a model of settlement  with asymmetric  information;  see Steven 
Shavell, Sharing  of Information  prior to Settlement  or Litigation,  20 Rand J. Econ. 183 
(1989),  for a model in which information  that is initially  asymmetric  is shared,  or disclosed 
under  discovery, and in which  parties  then frequently  settle; and see also Bruce Hay, Civil 
Discovery:  Its Effects and Optimal  Scope, 23 J. Legal Stud. 481 (1994),  on discovery. See, 
in addition,  Kathryn  Spier, Settlement  Bargaining  and the Design of Damage  Awards, 10 
J. L., Econ., & Org. 84 (1994),  for a model in which settlement  becomes less likely when 
damages  are based on accurate  assessment  of harm  because this introduces  an added ele- 
ment about  which there  can be asymmetric  information. 
9 Uninsured  risk-averse  defendants  would take lower precautions  if damages equalled 
average  harm  rather  than  actual  harm  because  the prospect  of causing  an accident  involves 
lower risk-bearing  costs. Such a reduction  in precautions,  however, would tend to be effi- 
cient because defendants'  risk-bearing  costs are social costs. Compare  the discussion of 
defendants'  prospective  litigation  costs in note 5 above. 
'0 This statement  applies  if harm  is monetary.  If a component  of harm  (such as pain and 
suffering)  is not monetary  and  does not affect  the marginal  utility  of wealth,  then  risk-averse 
plaintiffs  as well as defendants  will prefer damages  for that component  to be based on 
average  harm. 
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instead set damages equal to average harm. Then an injurer  will know 
that the level of damages he will pay if an accident occurs will be a 
constant  and  will not be affected  by his level of precautions-even  though 
the distribution  of harm  will be lower the higher  the level of precautions. 
Thus, injurers  will have inadequate  incentives to exercise precautions. 
(They will consider  only the reduction  in the probability  of harm,  but not 
the reduction  in its magnitude,  conditional  on harm  occurring.)  By con- 
trast, if courts accurately determine harm, injurers  will know that the 
damages they pay, if accidents occur, will tend to be lower the greater 
the level of precautions they exercise, so injurers' incentives to take 
precautions  will be optimal. 
Note, however, that complete accuracy in the determination  of harm 
is unnecessary: as long as courts' estimates are unbiased (given the in- 
jurers' level of precaution), incentives will be optimal. Suppose that 
courts' estimates of average harm  are derived from a simple description 
of an accident (which would contain some information  about  the severity 
of injury).  Then injurers  who take greater  precautions  will expect to pay 
lower damages  and thus will have appropriate  incentives to take precau- 
tions. Greater  accuracy  will produce  little if any additional  benefit.12 
e) Quality of Information.  Although we assumed in the model that 
parties  and the courts either  possessed no information  about harm-they 
knew only its probability  density f-or  possessed or acquired perfect 
information,  the model can be interpreted  more broadly.  The "ignorant" 
state of knowledge  can reflect  real knowledge  of harm:  f can describe the 
distribution  of losses for any class of accidents, however narrow (such 
as mistaken  releases of a specific pollutant  into the atmosphere).  At the 
same time, the "perfectly  informed"  state of knowledge  can be less than 
perfect: h can be reinterpreted  as the mean of h conditional  on receipt of 
information  about h (such as the expected harm  given the quantity  of the 
pollutant  that escaped), rather  than  as the true h (the actual  losses caused 
by the pollutant),  without any effect on our analysis. 
12 Assume, for example, that there are two types of harm-minor injury  and long-term 
disability-and that the magnitude  of each type of harm  varies  among  victims. Assume too 
that precautions  not only reduce the probability  of accidents  but also make it less likely 
that harm  will be of the more serious type. Finally, assume that injurers  do not know, ex 
ante, anything  about a particular  potential  victim. Now a court's immediate  observation 
about  an accident  would  include  the type of harm,  even though  substantial  additional  expen- 
diture might be required  to determine  a particular  victim's harm. Using only the courts' 
initial  estimate  of harm  would be sufficient  to induce  injurers  to take optimal  care (condi- 
tional on the information  they possess ex ante): the damage  award  for each type of harm 
would be an unbiased  estimate  of harm  given that type, and injurers  only know the likeli- 
hood of each type of harm  ex ante and the distribution  of harms  for each type, not the 
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f)  Courts'  Information.  We supposed  for simplicity  in the model that 
courts knew the probability  density f  of harm at the outset. Another 
assumption, which is often realistic, is that courts do not know f,  but 
when harm occurs, courts costlessly observe certain characteristics  z of 
the harm (for example, that a car of a certain  type was demolished, that 
a person of a certain age was killed). The court then has two options. 
First, it may set damages equal to the mean harm, conditional  on these 
characteristics,  denoted by h(z). Second, it may hear evidence sufficient 
to allow it to determine  the actual level of harm. This would require  an 
expenditure  of k. 
Under this alternative  assumption,  the essential nature of our results 
would be unchanged.  Where  we had said that courts should set damages 
equal to h, we now say that courts should set damages equal to h(z). 
Consider, for example, Proposition l(a),  dealing with the case where 
injurers  do not know harm  ex ante. Our claim now is that courts should 
not observe h and should set damages  equal to h(z). When this is done, 
the expected liability  of injurers  will again  be h because the mean of h(z) 
equals h. As a result, injurers  will behave  just as they would if damages 
were  . 13 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
The most immediate  implications  of our analysis can be well illustrated 
by considering the assessment of damages in a familiar  and important 
context-automobile  accident cases. Typically, a person who is injured 
in an automobile  accident  will gather  and present  evidence from a variety 
of sources, notably, from medical  experts and from labor market  special- 
ists on forgone earnings.  The defendant  in response will seek to counter 
the plaintiffs assertions about his losses. The parties' expenditures  are 
likely to be substantial  because either will spend a dollar whenever it is 
expected to alter expected damages by more than a dollar in his favor. 
Thus, if the stakes in an accident were in the neighborhood  of,  say, 
$100,000,  each side might  well expend $20,000  contesting damages.14 
Yet, as our analysis suggests, the prospect of such spending  on proof 
of damages  in automobile  accidents  is unlikely  to influence  drivers'  incen- 
13  Consider  also proposition l(b), dealing  with the case where injurers  know harm  ex 
ante. It is clear that, again, it will be optimal  for the courts to observe h if the cost k is 
sufficiently  low because, if the courts  use h(z), injurers'  incentives  to take precautions  will 
be less desirable  than if courts use h. (However, injurers'  incentives  to take precautions 
will be superior  when courts use h(z)  than  when courts  use h. Hence, k must  be lower now 
for it to be worthwhile  for the courts to observe h than in the model we studied.) 
14 Moreover,  as we noted in Section IIIb  above, the parties  might  find  it rational  to spend 
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tives toward safety. When choosing his level of precautions-how  fast 
to drive, whether to go home by taxi after indulging-a  driver cannot 
predict  the  particular  level  of  harm he  would  cause  in  an  accident- 
whether the victim will be a bricklayer  or a doctor, whether  the victim's 
injuries  will be minor, include broken  bones, or result in death. Rather, 
a driver's prior  knowledge  will be only vague and approximate. 
It follows that resources could be saved without compromising  incen- 
tives by circumscribing  the damage  assessment process. Now in our anal- 
ysis, we had assumed that courts know the average  harm  and use this as 
the quantum  of damages.  But it is unnecessary  for courts  to know average 
harm.  At the outset of a case, courts will possess, essentially  free of cost, 
a simple physical description  of the plaintiff's  injury-for  instance, that 
a 35-year-old person suffered a broken leg. If damages are based on 
this description-if  damages equal expected harm conditional on this 
description-then  injurers'  expected liability  will equal average  harm, so 
their incentives toward  safety will be the same as if damages  equal aver- 
age harm. (This was the point that we discussed in Section IIIf.) 
How can courts constrain  the use of resources  on damage  assessment? 
One approach  is for courts to impose restrictions  on parties' litigation 
effort devoted to demonstrating  damages. For example, the number  of 
testifying  experts could be limited. Such steps are quite plausible:  judges 
are routinely  involved in controlling  the intensity  of litigation,  and recent 
procedural  reforms  are designed  to curtail  litigation  efforts generally.  As 
long as restrictions  do not generate  systematic  biases in damage  awards, 
they should not have any effect on drivers'  incentives. 
Another approach,  and a radical  departure  from practice, is to elimi- 
nate the damage  assessment  process and  replace  it with the use of damage 
tables.15  Each entry in a damage  table would equal the mean loss for a 
specific, physically  described  injury  (such as for a broken  arm).16  In such 
15  Although  the use of damage  tables would be a radical  departure  from practice  in the 
courts, it is of course true that various  statutory  compensation  systems, such as the work- 
ers' compensation  system, employ damage  tables to determine  awards.  For an analysis  of 
the adequacy  of workers'  compensation  damage  payments, see Patricia  M. Danzon, The 
Political  Economy  of Workers'  Compensation:  Lessons for Product  Liability,  78 Am. Econ. 
Ass'n Papers  & Proc. 305 (1988). 
16 If the table were biased, injurers'  incentives  would not be optimal.  Any biases would 
have to be compared  to those arising  with jury awards  that may reflect sympathies  for 
parties  and other extraneous  factors. Indeed, some have advocated  damage  tables in large 
part  because  of a belief  that  the tables  would  be less biased  than  jury awards  are today. See, 
for example,  Albert  W. Alschuler,  Mediation  with a Mugger:  The Shortage  of Adjudicative 
Services and the Need for a Two-Tier  Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 
1808  (1986);  and Frederick  S. Levin, Pain and Suffering  Guidelines:  A Cure  for Damages 
Measurement  "Anomie," 22 Univ. Mich. J. L. Reform 303 (1989). For a discussion of 
methods  for constructing  damage  schedules  and of difficulties  that may be encountered  in 
so doing, see Randall  R. Bovbjerg,  Frank  A. Sloan, & James F. Blumstein,  Valuing  Life 
and Limb in Tort: Scheduling  "Pain  and Suffering,"  83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 908 (1989). 203  ASSESSMENT  OF DAMAGES 
a system, it is apparent  that, as just stated, a driver's incentives would 
indeed be no different from what they are in today's regime: a driver 
would say to himself, "I cannot forecast the kind of accident and the 
injuries  that I may cause, but I do know that  if I am found  liable, damages 
will be based on a physical description of the injuries together with a 
table  giving average losses for those injuries." It is plain, we think, that 
this  driver  would behave in much  the same way he would if he anticipated 
that  losses would be calculated  to the last penny.17 
The potential appeal that we see in restricting  litigation effort or in 
using  damage  tables is what others have long stressed as their virtue:  the 
achievement  of cost savings. But prior discussions have largely ignored 
the question of whether changing the process of damage assessment 
might  detrimentally  influence  injurers'  behavior.18  What we add to prior 
work, therefore, is the point that simplified  damage assessment would 
not  distort  injurers'  behavior  when, as we believe to be true  in the context 
of  driving,  injurers'  foreknowledge  of harm  is ordinarily  less precise than 
what  courts would immediately  observe about harm  after an accident.19 
We  hasten to say, however, that in many contexts substantial  regula- 
tion  of parties' efforts to establish damages  or the use of damage tables 
will  be undesirable  because injurers'  ex ante perceptions  of harm  will be 
more  accurate than courts' initial estimates. Consider  a situation  where 
a  builder  might  cause a delay in completing  a commercial  building.  Here 
the  builder  would often have a fair  understanding  of the cost of delay (or 
could  inquire  about it). Damage  tables based on general  averages of loss 
for  construction  delay would tend to be less accurate  than the builder's 
prior  estimate. Accordingly,  the use of tables, or of only cursorily  consid- 
ered  losses, to arrive  at damages  would influence  contract  breach  behav- 
ior  relative to a reasonably full consideration  of losses.  For example, 
when  losses are known to be higher  than in the tables, breach would be 
too frequent. (To be  sure, such inefficient breach is  often avoidable 
through  the use of liquidated  damage provisions or through  bargaining 
before  breach.) 
17  For qualifications  concerning  litigation  costs and  risk  aversion,  see notes 5 and  9 above. 
18  For example,  the commentary  to the recently  implemented  amendments  to the Federal  Rules  of Civil  Procedure  does not discuss the effect of litigation  on injurers'  behavior,  either  in  suggesting  the rationale  for various  limits  or in offering  guidance  to judges in exercising  their  discretion.  The literature  on damage  tables is somewhat  more attentive to injurers'  behavior.  It  sometimes  suggests  that  behavior  would  be improved  because  the tables would  more  accurately  measure  harm  than  present  jury awards;  see note 16 supra.  This contrasts  with  our  point  about  damage  tables:  we assume  that  damage  tables  will be less accurate  than  present  jury  awards  and  emphasize  that,  even so, injurers'  behavior  will not  be  detrimentally 
affected. 
19  Our  analysis  also adds  to the literature  because  of its relevance  to the design  of damage  tables:  it raises questions  about  the social value of highly  detailed  tables and of permitting  parties  to prove that their  losses are different  from  those in the tables. 204  THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
Thus,  there are circumstances  where  the magnitude of losses  can be 
well anticipated by potential injurers and, consequently,  where our analy- 
sis  implies  that accuracy  in estimating  damages  would  improve  incen- 
tives. Nonetheless,  the reader will recall that we showed that parties may 
still have an excessive  incentive to spend to show damages,  so that some 
restrictions on their efforts may be warranted.20 
Last, we  should  say that constraining the ability of litigants to prove 
damages, whether  through use  of tables  or through limitations  on their 
expenditures,  is likely to be met with the objection  that victims  will be 
compensated less  accurately.  It is true, as we noted in Section  IIIc, that 
imprecise matching of damage payments  to victims'  losses  represents  a 
social cost  when  victims  are  risk-averse and are  not  insured.2'  But  it 
can be  demonstrated  that,  even  if the  sole  function  of liability were  to 
compensate uninsured,  risk-averse victims,  their incentives  to establish 
harm in adjudication would  be excessive.22  Moreover,  the relevance  of 
victims' risk aversion  is attenuated by the fact that ownership  of insur- 
ance is widespread.23 
APPENDIX 
Proof  of Proposition  1.  (a)  If  courts do not observe h, then a single level of 
damages  d applies to all injurers,  and each injurer  chooses  x  to minimize 
x + p(x)d,  (A1) 
so  all choose  x*(d).  Social costs are given by 
J [x*(d) + p(x*(d))h]f(h)dh = x*(d) + p(x*(d))h.  (A2) 
20  This is always  true with regard to proof beyond what injurers could have anticipated,  and  our analysis demonstrates  that it may be true even  when injurers accurately anticipate 
harm. 
21 We  also  noted  that more accurate  compensation  of  victims  means  that more risk is 
imposed  on injurers, which lowers  social welfare to the extent that injurers are  risk-averse 
and  do not possess  liability insurance. 
22  This is because,  after a victim has suffered a loss,  his incentive to spend to demonstrate 
the  level  of his losses  is quite strong: he will spend  up  to a dollar to increase  his coverage 
by  a dollar. (And defendants'  incentives  to reduce liability are similar.) Yet such post-loss 
expenditure  exceeds  that which can be justified on grounds of risk reduction. See, generally,  Louis  Kaplow,  Optimal Insurance Contracts When Establishing the Amount of Losses  Is 
Costly,  19 Geneva  Papers on Risk  & Ins.  Theory  139 (1994), on excessive  incentives  of 
insureds  to establish  their losses  to an insurer. 
23  An implication of the discussion  in this paragraph is that accuracy  in estimating loss 
is  more  important for purposes  of  insurance  than for the liability  system  (when  injurers  lack  precise  ex ante information about loss).  Yet the liability system  employs  more expen- 
sive  means of assessing  damages than is typical in consensual first-party insurance contracts 
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As (A2) is minimized  when d =  h, h is the optimal  level of damages, and social 
costs are 
x*(h) + p(x*(h))h.  (A3) 
If courts observe h and d =  h (which will be shown to be an optimal  choice 
of d), then because injurers  do not know what h will be, they will choose x to 
minimize 
x + p(x) J  (h + k)f(h)dh = x + p(x)(h + k),  (A4)  o 
so they will choose x*(h + k), and social costs will be 
x*(h + k) + p(x*(h + k))(h + k).  (A5) 
It follows also that d =  h must be an optimum  when h is observed, for when 
injurers  do  not know h  ex ante and thus all choose the same x, (A4) gives social 
costs, which are minimized  when x is x*(h +  k).24  Because (A5)  exceeds (A3) 
for  any positive k, we have established  l(a). 
(b)  In this case, if courts do not observe h,  injurers_will  behave as they  did  in 
the  previous case, so optimal  damages  will again be  h,  and (A3) will again give 
social  costs. 
If  courts observe  h  and  d =  h (which will be shown to be optimal), then a 
party  of type h minimizes x + p(x)(h + k) because he will pay damages  of h and 
bear  costs of k if there is an accident. Hence, he will select  x*(h +  k). Because 
this  choice of  x  is optimal  given the assumption  that h  is observed, it is optimal 
for  damages  to equal h.  Social costs in this situation  are 
f  [x*(h + k) + p(x*(h + k))(h + k)]f(h)dh.  (A6)  o 
The  difference  in social costs between the situations  where h is not observed  and  when it is observed is (A3) minus (A6): 
x*(h)  + p(x*(h))h - J  [x*(h + k) + p(x*(h + k))(h + k)]f(h)dh.  (A7) 
When  k =  0,  (A7) equals 
J {[x*(h) + p(x*(h))h] -  [x*(h) + p(x*(h))h]}f(h)dh,  (A8) 
which  is positive because for every h other than  h, x*(h) differs  from  x*(h)-the 
optimal  level of precaution exceeds (is less  than) x*(h) when h exceeds  (is  less  than) h. In addition, it is clear that (A7) is decreasing  in k because, as k 
increases,  (A6) rises; also, (A7) is negative  for all k that are sufficiently  large.25  It  follows that there is a critical  k*  >  0  such that k <  k*  implies  that it is socially  desirable  to observe h and such that k >  k* implies  that it is not socially worth- 
while  to observe h. 
Proof  of Proposition  2.  We need to complete  the proof  of part  2(b).  To deter- 
24  Of course, d =  h for all h is also an optimum. 
25  If  k  >  h, then the integrand  in (A7) exceeds x*(h) + p(x*(h))h for all positive h, so  (A7)  must be negative  for such k. 206  THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
mine whether it is socially optimal  for injurers  to learn h, note that, if injurers 
do not observe h ex ante, minimum  social cost is (A3) by proposition  l(a),  and 
if injurers  do observe h ex ante, minimum  social cost is (A6)  plus c, by proposition 
l(b). Hence, it is socially optimal  for injurers  to learn h if and only if 
x*(h) + p(x*(h))h -  c +  r  [x*(h + k) 
(A9) 
+ p(x*(h + k))(h + k)]f(h)dh} > O. 
(This  will hold if c and k are sufficiently  low.) 
We need to show that when (A9) holds, injurers  will be induced  to learn h if 
d =  h. If an injurer  does not learn h ex ante, he will choose x to minimize 
x + p(x) J  (h + k)f(h)dh = x + p(x)(h + k),  (A10) 
*o 
so that his costs will be x*(h +  k) + p(x*(h +  k))(h +  k). If an injurer  does 
learn  h ex ante, his costs will be (A6) plus c. Hence, an injurer  will be led to 
learn  h if 
c  < [x*(h + k) +p(x*(h + k))(h + k)] 
,xo  (All)  -  [x*(h + k) + p(x*(h + k))(h + k)]f(h)dh. 
o 
We  want to show that (A9) implies (A11). But this follows because 
x*(h) + p(x*(h))h <x*(h  + k) + p(x*(h + k))(h + k). 
Proof of Proposition  3.  The remarks  in the text constitute  a proof. 
Proof  of Proposition  4.  To prove that the optimal  rule is as claimed,  consider 
the problem of a dictator  whose goal is to minimize  social costs and who  can 
command  parties  whether  or not to spend k to reveal h to courts (but  who cannot 
command  levels of precaution).  The level of social costs  achievable  by the dicta- 
tor  will clearly be at least as low as under  the optimal  rule. We will determine 
the optimal solution to the dictator's  problem  and then show that this solution 
can be  sustained  under  the rule described  in the proposition.  Thus, that rule must 
be  optimal. 
Let  S be the optimal  set of h where individuals  are ordered  by the dictator  to 
be silent about h, and let R be the optimal  set of h where individuals  are made 
to  reveal h. We assume for  convenience  that  each set is a union  of nondegenerate 
intervals.26  It is evident (by the logic in proposition  l(a))  that  for h in  S, the 
optimal  x for defendants  to choose is  x*(hc), where hc is the conditional  mean of 
h  in  S;  this x will be chosen if  d =  hc. It  is apparent  also that for  h in R, it is 
optimal for  defendants to choose x*(h  +  k); this will occur if a defendant's 
expenses  are h +  k,  that is, if  d =  h and defendants  bear k. 
Let  us assume provisionally  that S  is not empty (we will prove this below), so 
26  If  we  did  not make this assumption,  then in particular  we would have to concern 
ourselves  with the fact that the optimal  R and S are not unique with respect to isolated 
points;  any number  of isolated points  can  be assigned to either R or S without affecting 
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that hc exists, and let us characterize  the form of S. Let h~  be the supremum  of 
h in R that are less than hc. We claim that any h < h~  is in R. Now for any h in 
R, we know that 
x*(h + k) + p(x*(h + k))(h + k)  x*(hc) + p(x*(hc))h.  (A12) 
That is, expected costs are lower (or equal) if a party reports harm than if he 
does not. It follows that 
x*(hl + k) + p(x*(h1 + k))(h1  + k)<  x*(hc) + p(x*(hc))hi.  (A13) 
Inequality  (A13) implies that h~ + k -  hc: otherwise, 
x*(hI  +  k) + p(x*(h1  +  k))(hl  +  k)>x*(hc)  + p(x*(hc))hc  ( 
-  -  ~~~~(A14) 
-x*(h)  + p(x*(hc))hl, 
which contradicts  (A13). Hence, p(x*(h~ +  k)) 2  p(x*(hc)), so that 
p(x*(h4 +  k))(hl -  h)- p(x*(hc))(h1 -  h) 
for h <  hi. The latter inequality  and (A13) imply that, for h <  h~, 
x*(hl + k) + p(x*(h1 + k))(h + k)<x*(hc)  + p(x*(hc))h.  (A15) 
But, for h <  h , 
x*(h + k) + p(x*(h + k))(h + k) <x*(hi  + k) + p(x*(hi + k))(h + k).  (A16) 
This and (A15) imply 
x*(h + k) + p(x*(h + k))(h + k) <x*(hc)  + p(x*(hc))h.  (A17) 
Hence, for h <  hi,  it is better for a party to report h than not; h is in R, as 
claimed. A parallel argument  shows that, if h2 is defined as the infimum  of h 
in R that are greater  than he, then all h >  h2 are in R. Thus, we know that S 
consists of the interval  [h~, h2]. 
Because S is optimal, h~ and h2 must be selected to minimize social costs. 
Social costs as a function  of h~ and h2 are given by 
ff  [x*(h + k) + p(x*(h + k))(h + k)]f(h)dh 
^o 
+ f  [x*(hc) + p(x*(hc))h]f(h)dh  (A18) 
+  f  [x*(h + k) + p(x*(h + k))(h + k)]f(h)dh. 
The derivative  of (A18) with respect to h~ is 
{[x*(hl + k) + p(x*(hl + k))(hl + k)] -  [x*(h~) + p(x*(hc))hl]}f(hl).  (A19) 
For  hi  ~ _hc  -  k,  (A19) is  negative, as  demonstrated in  (A14). There- 
fore, hi <  hc -  k, assuming such an hl is feasible (otherwise, hl  =  0). The 
derivative  of (A18) with respect to h2 is 
{[x*(hc) + p(x*(hc))h2] -  [x*(h2  + k) + p(x*(h2 + k))(h2  4- k)]}f(h2).  (A20) 208  THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
At h2 = hc, this is negative, because 
x*(hc) + p(x*(hc))hc  < x*(hc + k) + p(x*(hc + k))(hc  + k).  (A21) 
Hence,  h2 >  hc. 
It remains  to show that S is not empty. If this is not true-that  is, if R equals 
the set of all positive h-select  any positive h and denote it by h~. Then social 
costs will be lowered if parties are silent and pay h~ whenever h falls in some 
small  nondegenerate  interval  [h,, h2].27  This contradicts  the supposed  optimality 
of R. 
We have now proved that the optimal  rule for the dictator  is characterized  as 
follows: there is an interval  [h~, h2], where  h_ < hc -  k and h2 >  hc, on which 
parties  do not report  h and pay damages  of h  c; outside  the interval,  parties  report 
h, pay damages  of h, and defendants  bear k. It is clear (and was explained  after 
the proposition)  that under  the rule of the proposition,  with this [h~,  h2], parties 
behave as the dictator would want. Thus, as stated at the outset, because the 
rule  in the proposition  implements  the dictator's  optimal  scheme, the rule in the 
proposition  must be optimal. 
Proof of Proposition  5.  From the notes following  the proposition,  it is clear 
that  it suffices to show that if it is optimal  for injurers  to spend c to learn h ex 
ante, they will be led to do this under  the rule specified  in proposition  4. 
If injurers  do not learn h ex ante, minimum  social costs will be (A3), and if 
injurers  do learn  h, minimum  social costs will be 
f0"'  [x*(h + k) + p(x*(h + k))(h + k)]f(h)dh 
+  f2[x*(h~)  q-  p(x*(hc))h]f(h)dh  (A22) 
h,h 
+  f  [x*(h + k) + p(x*(h + k))(h + k)]f(h)dh + c, 
Jh! 
where  [h~, h2] is the optimal  interval.  Thus, it is socially desirable  for injurers  to 
learn  h if (A22) is less than (A3). 
Now let us show that when (A22) is less than (A3), injurers  will in fact learn 
h, provided  that the rule in proposition  4 applies. Given that this rule applies, if 
injurers  do not learn h, they will choose x to minimize 
ht  [x + p(x)(h + k)]f(h)dh + X  [x + p(x)h]f(h)dh 
Jo  jh,  (A23) 
+ f  [x + p(x)(h + k)]f(h)dh. 
If  injurers  do learn  h, their  expected costs will be given by (A22). Thus, they will 
learn  h if (A22) is less than (A23). But (A23) exceeds (A3) because (A3) is the 
minimum  value of 
27  Social  costs  will  be  given  by  (A18),  but with  the  integrand in  the  second  integral 
x*(hl) +  p(x*(hl))h.  The derivative of this with respect to h2 is {[x*(hl)  +  p(x*(h))h2]  - 
[x*(h2 +  k) +  p(x*(h2  + k))(h2  +  k)]}. At h2 =  hl, the derivative is negative,  so that social 
costs  are lower for some h2 > h,. 209  ASSESSMENT  OF DAMAGES 
o  [x + p(x)  h]f(h) dh.  (A24) 
Hence, when (A22) is less than (A3), (A22) will also be less than (A23), and 
injurers  will decide to learn h ex ante. 
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